









Brexit and Competition Law: Future Directions of Domestic Enforcement 





Brexit – the UK’s exit from the European Union – brings unprecedented challenges and opportunities of historic magnitude across a raft of legal and policy fields. One of these fields is competition law. These challenges and opportunities deserve careful assessment – whatever shape the outcome of the detachment process might eventually take – in order to prepare for an increasingly uncertain future ahead. 

This article considers and analyses the future directions for UK domestic competition law enforcement in light of Brexit. The article addresses a range of issues, including: the likelihood of significant post-Brexit reform; the government’s commitment to competition in local markets; the relevance of industrial policy; the issue of regulation; and aspects of institutional structure of the UK competition law regime. The article will also consider changes to UK competition law which currently appear on the horizon.  
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1.	INTRODUCTION
Discussing the future of a competition law regime is always a difficult task. Among other things, discharging this task requires one to make predictions, which in practice could easily amount to nothing more than mere speculations. There are many reasons why making sound predictions of future directions of a competition law regime is not possible in some cases. The main reason perhaps is uncertainty, which often is triggered by political and economic circumstances and which may exist in abundance in a given situation.
What is said here holds particularly true for the UK competition law regime, which has been facing extreme uncertainty since 23 June 2016 when the majority of British voters decided that the UK should exit from the European Union (EU). Arguably, there has never been a time when the regime faced even a remotely similar level of uncertainty. Arguably, also, as a development, Brexit is globally unprecedented; thus, there are no examples one could consult when discussing the future of UK competition law and policy. 
As things stand, the UK competition law regime is in a most peculiar position, in which it is possible, because of Brexit, to identify both challenges and opportunities for the regime and its leading actor, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). These challenges and opportunities exist in relation to more than one aspect of UK competition law and policy. Three of these aspects however are important to identify because they are the key ones, namely: the future place and role of the regime internationally; the regime’s future relationship with its EU counterpart; and future directions of domestic enforcement.
This article offers a critical assessment of the third of these three aspects.​[1]​ In doing so, the article considers a number of components of UK domestic competition law enforcement. All of these components are bound to be influenced by Brexit. These components include: the likelihood of significant reform of UK competition law (Part 2); the level of commitment to competition and competition law enforcement expected on the part of government (Part 3); the relevance and role of UK industrial policy (Pat 4); the prospects of more regulation in UK markets, especially in the special sectors (Part 5); and institutional aspects of the UK competition law regime (Part 6). The discussion of these components will be followed with some reflections spelling out the implications of the analysis (Part 7) and concluding thoughts (Part 8). 
2.	THE LIKELIHOOD OF REFORM	
The past two decades saw the UK competition law regime undergo significant, what many observers would call radical,​[2]​ changes. Those changes began with the adoption, in 1998, of the Competition Act 1998 (hereinafter: the ‘CA1998’) and four years later were extended with the adoption of the Enterprise Act 2002 (hereinafter: the ‘EA2002’). These two Acts represent, by any standard, enormously significant legislative developments. The Acts were designed to finally push UK competition law towards the modern ages following decades in which it was largely outdated and in many ways neither efficient nor effective.​[3]​ The Labour government at the time had a twin objective of: bringing UK competition law as close as possible to EU competition law; and giving the UK a ‘world class’ competition law regime, which would make markets work well for consumers.​[4]​
The CA1998 introduced the two famous prohibitions, the chapter I prohibition (of all types of anticompetitive behaviour) and the chapter II prohibition (of abusive dominance) which were modelled respectively on Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In order to make the alignment between UK and EU competition law meaningful, a special provision, section 60, was included in the Act. This came to be known as the ‘consistency’ provision because it laid down a duty to interpret the chapter I and II prohibitions in a consistent manner with relevant EU competition law — principally the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU — on anticompetitive behaviour and abusive dominance.​[5]​ Section 60 also introduced a duty to have regard to decisions and statements by the European Commission when applying the prohibitions. 
The EA2002, on the other hand, whilst not furthering the modelling of UK competition law on the basis of EU competition law, introduced several significant changes in a number of areas, including: merger control;​[6]​ the criminalisation of cartel behaviour;​[7]​ market investigation references and studies;​[8]​ and the institutional structure of the UK regime.​[9]​
The significant reform within the UK competition law regime however was not confined to the adoption of the CA1998 and EA2002. In 2013, further far-reaching changes were introduced under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (hereinafter: ‘ERRA2013’), which, in addition to the changes it made in the areas of merger control and criminal cartel enforcement,​[10]​ most famously merged the old Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the old Competition Commission (CC) into a single body, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).
When considering all of these legislative developments – noting the short time span within which they unfolded – one may easily form the impression that there has been a highly visible recent trend in the UK to opt for significant or ‘radical’ reform in the competition arena. This point carries particular importance and relevance in light of Brexit since it is perfectly legitimate to believe that further significant changes will be made to UK competition law and policy once the UK is no longer an EU member state. This belief exists regardless of the kind of future relationship the UK will have with the EU.​[11]​ 
Recent developments show quite vividly how the likelihood of reform is quite high. The most important of these developments is the set of proposals, which the serving Chairman of the CMA, Andrew Tyrie, submitted to the former Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Policy (BEIS), Greg Clark, on 21 February 2019 (hereinafter: the ‘Tyrie proposals’). The Secretary of State had requested these proposals, in which, it seems, the serving prime minister at the time, Theresa May, was also interested.​[12]​ Such interest at the highest political level is very noteworthy.
The high likelihood of reform makes it particularly vital to assess the necessity and desirability of introducing such reform after exit day. The present article will conduct such assessment — in light of the relevant (competition law) elements of the Tyrie proposals —​[13]​ in the context of the discussion on the imperative and voluntary future changes to UK competition law. The article emphasises such distinction given it is important not to confuse the two types of changes. The former changes should be seen as inevitable (and thus imperative) due to Brexit since they come to ensure an appropriate detachment is introduced between UK and EU competition law and to allow UK competition law and policy to develop with the necessary autonomy in the future. These changes do not however amount to voluntary reform, with which the present article is more concerned. The discussion will return to the issue of reform in part 7(3) below.​[14]​  
3.	A DEEP, UNCHANGED, COMMITMENT TO COMPETITION AND COMPETITION LAW?
In the wake of the outcome of the EU referendum, various quarters of the UK competition law community were quick to focus the ‘Brexit competition law question’ on the kind of inevitable legislative changes mentioned in the previous part which, according to views from within these quarters, the UK government should or should not, need or need not, make to the CA1998 and the EA2002. There has been an obvious tendency, thus, to present the question as being one of, more or less, merely legislative changes needed to be made to both Acts.​[15]​ The Brexit competition law question however is not as narrow as this. It actually penetrates far deeper than the different alterations, which the CA1998 in particular must undergo as part of the preparation for the UK’s exit from the EU. Before recognising that Brexit mandates some legislative changes, the Brexit competition law question must be seen, first of all, as it is in actual fact, namely: a question of commitment by government to competition and to competition law. The question is, specifically, whether post-Brexit this commitment will remain deep and unchanged. 
The issue of government’s commitment to competition rests at the heart of the Brexit competition law question because Brexit extends far beyond the field of competition law and policy. The UK competition law community should be concerned whether competition law would be sufficiently prioritised by government in the detachment negotiations with the EU or as it maps out the UK economic course domestically and internationally. Equally, the community should also be concerned whether — especially given the enormous uncertainties of Brexit — competition law will receive the necessary, high-level, attention following the eventual exit of UK competition law from the ambit of the EU competition law regime. 
What is said in the previous paragraph is not meant to cast doubt over the genuineness of the various declarations made by government concerning the importance of competition and competition law.​[16]​ Rather it is meant to offer a realistic perspective of the chances that the depth and strength of government’s commitment to the process of competition and competition law will, in fact, remain intact post-Brexit. These chances, quite naturally, are affected by several factors, some of which may be considered intrinsic to competition policy whilst others are extrinsic. The focus of the discussion below is on intrinsic factors since the present article concerns future directions of domestic enforcement, whereas extrinsic factors are better analysed in relation to other strands of the Brexit competition law question, specifically the future place and role of the UK competition law regime internationally.​[17]​
The two most important intrinsic factors which are likely to influence government’s commitment to competition and competition law are: the influence of business interests; and the role of public interest considerations. These factors will be discussed in turn.  
3.1	THE INTERESTS OF BUSINESSES V. THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS
One of the major goals and outcomes of the significant reforms of the 1990s and 2000s, as mentioned above, was placing consumers and their interests at the heart of all enforcement efforts and policy choices by UK competition authorities. The mantra ‘making markets work well for consumers’ became a well-rehearsed and well-established slogan of the old OFT when the CA1998 and later the EA2002 were adopted and especially when the OFT saw the position of Director General of Fair Trading at its helm become replaced with an OFT board of directors led by a Chairman and a Chief Executive Officer. Upon the inauguration of the CMA, however, that slogan was expanded to include businesses and the economy as well.​[18]​ The move from only ‘consumers’ to ‘consumers, businesses and the economy’ is in many ways highly symbolic and is likely to become even more so following Brexit.  
Making markets work well for consumers and businesses alike is not necessarily a contradictory statement. The interests of both can, easily and comfortably, converge towards a common overarching objective when competition rules are enforced effectively and when sound competition policy is formulated. At the same time however, the interests of businesses and those of consumers can easily clash. This clash receives its boldest expression in anticompetitive situations, where the promotion of business interests can easily undermine consumer interests.​[19]​ Another instance in which such a clash can easily occur is a process like Brexit, which involves a great deal of policy design and in which politics is highly influential. It is important to be aware that, in this case, the interests of businesses can be the dominant force and this can overshadow the interests of consumers and marginalise them as a result. 
The chances of business interests triumphing consumer interests in the case of the UK’s departure from the EU are unquestionably high. Various indicators pointedly show that, not only are businesses in the driving seat as government prepares for the future after Brexit but also that it is extremely sensitive to the needs, demands and views of the business community.​[20]​ An illustration here can be seen in light of the consequence of the repeated failure by the May government to secure a parliamentary majority for the Brexit agreement it had negotiated with the EU. As is widely known, this failure threw the UK political system into unprecedented turmoil, culminating in the eviction of Theresa May as prime minister and triggered a leadership contest within the Conservative party in which candidates competed rather vigorously in expressing their pro-business positions and, in the case of the majority of those candidates, in their hard attitude towards the EU. Such positions and attitude were also evident in the December 2019 general election. 
Promoting and upholding the interests of businesses may be considered perfectly understandable because there is legitimacy in the view that the success of Brexit and that of the UK economy after Brexit largely depend on the success of UK businesses, especially internationally.     
At the same time, giving a strong expression to business interests as a sole or dominant consideration can be questionable, if not problematic, because such an approach means that government is highly likely to be guided in its judgement by international competitiveness whilst paying insufficient attention to the importance of having competitive domestic markets.​[21]​ This has the potential to affect the level of government’s commitment to the process of competition and competition law, though there is no suggestion by this author that intensive international competitiveness, vigorous competition in local markets and a meaningfully applied domestic competition rules cannot co-exist.​[22]​ They certainly can, but the risk is always there that a high degree of emphasis on international competitiveness may reduce the attention given to competition domestically and may even cause the latter to be pushed aside.​[23]​
3.2	THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUNDS
The second factor affecting the likelihood of the UK government’s commitment to competition and competition law is the role of public interest considerations, which in the case of the UK competition law regime have always been material and relevant.​[24]​ For many years, some areas of UK competition law rested on public interest grounds and this meant that the decision-making power over matters arising in those areas was in the hands of the relevant minister.​[25]​ The significant reform introduced under the EA2002 in particular – whilst removing the relevant minister from the heart of the decision-making process and replacing him/her with the competition authorities (currently the CMA) – left open the possibility for governmental intervention on specified public interest grounds.​[26]​ Under the EA2002, such grounds triumph contradictory competition grounds. In a given public interest case, therefore, the decision-making power is left in the hands of the relevant minister.​[27]​
The mere existence of public interest cases or grounds in a competition law regime does not, in itself, endanger the effective protection of competition or affect negatively the commitment by the relevant government and relevant competition authority to this goal. There is sufficient evidence both in the UK and beyond that the use of public interest grounds usually happens in exceptional cases.​[28]​ In fact, under the old UK Fair Trading Act 1973, merger and monopoly (i.e. market investigation) cases were normally decided using competition criteria notwithstanding the reference in that Act to the public interest.​[29]​
Having said that, the available evidence suggests that since the introduction of the EA2002, successive UK governments, whether Labour or Conservative, have opted on at least two occasions for expanding their control using public interest grounds. 
The first occasion arose at the time of the financial crisis in 2008 when the Labour government led by former prime minister Gordon Brown introduced ‘financial stability’ as a third public interest ground under the Act. This was famously done in order to be able to clear the Lloyd’s TSB/HBOS merger,​[30]​ which was seen as giving rise to serious competition concerns. The case showed rather clearly that government can easily use public interest considerations in a most remarkable fashion in order to remove any ‘obstacles’ caused by competition law. 
A second, more recent, occasion came in 2017, following the EU referendum, when the Conservative government led by former prime minister Theresa May published its Green Paper on National Security and Infrastructure Investment Review,​[31]​ in which BEIS set out a number of short and long-term options for legislative changes in order to enlarge the scope for government action in national security cases. The short-term changes were implemented in June 2018. These changes included lowering the turnover threshold (from £70 m to £1 m) and altering the wording of the share of supply test in section 23 of the EA2002​[32]​ in the case of mergers in certain specified national security sectors, namely: products used for military or dual (military and civilian) purposes; computing hardware; and quantum technology.​[33]​ The log-term legislative changes, on the other hand, were set out in a government White Paper which was published in July 2018. These changes were proposed for the purposes of exerting effective control over foreign investment in the UK where this investment poses a risk to national security.​[34]​ The changes were also outlined as part of the Queen’s speech, delivered on 14 October 2019.​[35]​
With these developments sitting in the background and with Brexit looming large, the scope is certainly there for government action to be taken more intensively on public interests grounds in the future. In light of the recent legislative changes mentioned in the previous paragraph, invoking national security grounds is rather likely even when the facts at hand may not support this. Arguably, this is where the main concern over the use of national security grounds is found. It is usually believed that because of the fluid nature of these grounds, the term national security can quite easily be interpreted in an expansive manner by politicians, opening thus the potential for abuse of power or possible unnecessary interference with foreign investment. ​[36]​ In a situation involving competition or competition law, this could result in an impact on government’s commitment to competition, not to mention the impact on the credibility of its ‘open door policy’, which is designed to attract the highest level of foreign investment in the UK economy. In addition to this, it seems highly probable that the UK economy will go through a phase of economic or industrial consolidation following Brexit. This not only expands the scope for the use of public interest considerations but also highlights the relevance of industrial policy considerations when handling competition questions once the UK is no longer an EU member state—an issue examined in the following part.
4.	THE RELEVANCE AND ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
The competition policy portfolio within government is placed under the auspices of a specific ministerial department, currently the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). This ministerial department saw over time many changes to both name and mandate. For many years, it was known as the Department of Trade and Industry (1970-2007), then as the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2007-2009), followed by the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (2009-2016). Such successive changes are both noteworthy and significant, especially the absence of any reference to ‘industry’ or ‘industrial’ in the name between 2007 and 2016. The current composition of this key government department – notably the re-introduction of an industrial reference in its name – was an immediate outcome of the government reshuffle following the EU referendum. This particular change to name and mandate was more than cosmetic: in many ways, it reflects the current thinking within government and specifically shows the relevance of industrial policy and its existing potential to play a major role in the management of the UK economy post-Brexit.
Brexit opens up many fundamental questions concerning the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy. A similar occurrence happened during the global economic crises of 2008, though in that context whilst those questions assumed a broad global dimension they were not addressed properly. There were nonetheless implications at that time for the UK competition law regime, not least the amendment introduced by the Labour government to the EA2002 leading to the addition of new public interest ground of ‘financial stability’, an issue discussed in the previous part.
The relationship between competition policy and industrial policy has been the subject of a long debate, which has never been settled.​[37]​ In particular, the question remains whether these two policies operate in conflict or in harmony.​[38]​ This has always been a highly relevant question in the UK, which – during some chapters of the twentieth century – openly embraced an industrial policy approach based on choosing ‘winners’ but one that also caused the country as a whole to suffer when the winners chosen proved to be the opposite of that.​[39]​ In some instances, industrial policy prevailed over competition policy and even caused the latter to become neglected.​[40]​ Although since then successive governments did not openly embrace this form of industrial policy, every impression was formed at times that this has been done in a covert manner.​[41]​
Since the EU referendum, it seems that UK industrial policy is being revived in the form of ‘industrial strategy’, as can be gleaned from the discussion above in relation to the recent composition of the BEIS but more pointedly from government’s actual policy as set out in its January 2017 Green Paper, Building Our Industrial Strategy​[42]​ and its November 2017 White Paper, Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain Fit for the Future.​[43]​  Although this revival has not been acknowledged by government, it is arguable that some of the characteristics of its industrial strategy open the door for traditional (old UK) industrial policy considerations to be used in the future.​[44]​ The Green and White Papers show how the new industrial strategy is based on two key ideas, namely: government and business should cooperate and – where they already do so – they should strive towards deeper cooperation; and the UK should be a state which intervenes in the marketplace strategically. In practice, the dividing line between government-business cooperation using traditional industrial policy tools and government-business cooperation based on the new industrial strategy pursued by the UK since 2016 can be very fine; the same also applies as far as strategic intervention in markets is concerned. Because of this, the kind of government-business cooperation and strategic government intervention in markets — featuring in the Green and White papers — can perfectly fall within the established definition of industrial policy. At the heart of industrial policy is an intervention by the state which seeks to re-allocate resources in different quarters of the economy, doing so in a strategic manner and with business interest being a dominant force.​[45]​
It would be difficult to condemn an industrial policy approach by government without showing the link between this approach and the adverse consequences such an approach could bring consumers, businesses and the economy as a whole. Indeed, even if one were to regard the various elements covered in the White Paper in particular as a form of industrial policy, it ought to be recognised that many of the elements have positive value, such as those dealing with: education; innovation and research and development; and infrastructure. Rather, the concern is over other elements contained in the Paper, principally those aimed at enlarging the size of certain sectors through a selective approach, which is designed to make it easier for established players in these sectors to survive as opposed to facilitating the development and/or entry of new technology or products.​[46]​ UK modern economic history clearly teaches that such an approach can lead to serious consequences, including causing competition law and policy to give way to industrial policy. Such consequences cannot be ruled out post-Brexit. The uncertainties surrounding what will happen after exit day mean it is likely government will take many actions in order to protect UK businesses and industry; especially, at a time when – globally – efforts are made to promote national champions and protectionism, including in the USA, China and the EU. The discussion will return to this point when presenting the implications of the analysis in part 7 in order to highlight its relevance to the UK in a post-Brexit era.  
5.	THE PROSPECTS OF MORE REGULATION
Over the past 3 decades in particular, every effort has been made by successive governments to decrease, where possible, the reliance on regulation and increase the reliance on the market mechanism.​[47]​ This has not however removed all forms of regulation.​[48]​ An illustration here can be found in the general mechanism for price control which has always been in the toolbox to be used whenever government seeks a quick fix to the economic system.
Controlling prices – where competition was previously introduced and is supposed to be the ‘rule’ and ‘standard’ – has consequences for competition law. One such consequence is the danger that the regulation in this case might be motivated by politics and not carried out in its proper economic context; not to mention legal uncertainty in what may be volatile markets.​[49]​ This uncertainty extends to the respective roles of sector regulators (who are supposed to be independent) and government. The dividing lines between these roles may become blurred in such a situation. This occurrence cannot be ruled out in any of the special sectors, though it is more likely in those sectors in which government has a specified role.​[50]​
Blurring the dividing lines between the separate role(s) of sector regulators and government can expand the prospects for non-economic considerations to interfere (and possibly clash) with the economic considerations of sector regulators.​[51]​ A direct implication of this is that, ultimately, government will have effective control. 
Brexit carries serious uncertainties as far as the prices of almost all types of products sold in the UK are concerned. Since the EU referendum, consumer prices have increased steadily. Some observers have also pointed out that the UK’s overall productivity has been dented significantly as a result of the decision to leave the EU.​[52]​ The expectation is that further, perhaps sharp, price increases and poorer productivity will be triggered once the UK has left the EU.​[53]​ The evidence available thus far shows that government is ready and willing to revert to price caps and price control – in some key sectors at least –​[54]​ in order to respond to such development. 
6.	THE INSTITUTIONAL SETUP
Any analysis of the future directions of domestic enforcement within the UK competition law regime can never be complete without a proper consideration of the institutional setup of the regime, in particular the position and role of the CMA and, to some extent, those of relevant sector regulators who enjoy competition enforcement powers. 
6.1	THE COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY
The creation of the CMA under ERRA2013 finally brought to an end a long-standing institutional setting, which most people regarded as highly inefficient and complex, namely the existence of two separate competition authorities, the old OFT and CC (and the OFT and MMC before that). This institutional ‘merger’ however has not solved several shortcomings, from which generations of UK competition authorities, including the CMA, have consistently suffered. Two such shortcomings are relevant to highlight here: the management issue within the authorities; and their enforcement agenda. 
6.1.1	The management issue
The dissolved OFT had existed in two different successive forms over years: from 1973 until 2003 during which years the OFT was led by the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT); and from 2003 until 2014 during which years the OFT, as noted above,​[55]​ was led by a board with a Chairman and a Chief Executive Officer. The decision to repeal the position of DGFT came because, among other things, the existence of considerable enforcement powers in the hands of a single person, the DGFT, was deemed inappropriate and unhealthy. It was thought that by splitting the role into two – of a Chief Executive Officer and Chairman – greater accountability, transparency and efficiency can be secured and this would be enhanced further with the creation of a corporate-style board, which pulls together expertise from different backgrounds and disciplines and from around the world. The belief in such management style and structure have been carried over into the CMA when it became operational in 2014. 
It would be fair to characterise the position of DGFT as a past defect of the UK competition law regime. Nonetheless, it is very arguable whether the best solution for this defect has been the split in the position in such manner, supplemented by the specific membership chosen for the (old) OFT and (current) CMA boards. Having a management board within a competition authority can certainly be beneficial for the reasons mentioned above, in addition to enhancing the chances for a more sound policy formulation. In the case of the OFT and CMA, however, this has not worked in an appropriately and sufficiently efficient manner. The main reason for this is that the existence of the board has rendered the two authorities quite academic in their approach. This has been highly damaging because such an approach arguably caused road bumps before the authorities’ strive towards being fully effective enforcing bodies. Having the CMA and OFT boards ‘benefit’ from an international perspective based on foreign experiences has not helped in the situation but rather steered the authorities more towards an ‘advocacy’ or ‘educational’ role at world stage. 
Needless to say, it is helpful and beneficial for UK competition authorities to contribute towards the global debate on various competition matters especially for the purposes of seeking convergence and harmonisation among the rules and principles applied in different competition law regimes. The international standing an authority such as the CMA (or the old OFT) enjoys makes it vital for it to engage with other world competition authorities within multilateral fora, whether the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Competition Network (ICN) or any other international initiative or body. The OFT and the CMA have indeed made an important contribution within such fora. However, this is not the fundamental or primary objective of UK competition authorities. Especially in light of the institutional reform of 2000 and 2014, this objective is supposed to be fighting anticompetitive situations and making markets work well for both consumers and businesses. It is perfectly justified to believe that the international advocacy role of UK competition authorities has been more visible and more successful than their enforcement roles. The various statistics, some of it are presented below, show this. In many ways, the focus on international engagement, like the quite academic style followed within the CMA and OFT boards has, at various stages, caused a loss of sufficient focus on the domestic enforcement tasks of the authorities.​[56]​ 
6.1.2	The enforcement agenda: getting it right
The second institutional shortcoming concerns the enforcement agenda of UK competition authorities and in particular managing expectations around that. The EA2002 reform, described in part 2 above, was considered radical and overdue. The reform was hailed by the (then) OFT as the essential change needed in order to finally deliver impressive results for UK consumers using a high-level agenda of unprecedented level of enforcement. The goals and objectives of the OFT were set at a very high par and these led to high expectations that tens of cases will be turned around by the OFT annually in the various areas, notably anticompetitive behaviour, abusive conduct and market investigations;​[57]​ not to mention enforcement actions in what was at that time the newly-established area of criminalisation of cartel behaviour. The reformed CAT was suitably resourced and prepared for many appeal actions, which it was expecting would come through its doors contesting OFT decisions.​[58]​ In parallel, ordinary courts were thought would begin a new intensive era of hearing criminal cartel offence actions. 
The OFT promises and the high expectations surrounding them however did not materialise at the end. The case statistics in the areas of anticompetitive behaviour, abusive conduct and criminal cartel enforcement are particularly telling here. In reality, during the period between 2003 (when the EA2002 came into force) and 2014 (when the CMA became operational under the ERRA2013), the achievements of the OFT in these areas were as follows:  
·	Anticompetitive behaviour—the OFT pursued around 24 cases: in only 10 of those cases, there was a positive conclusion reached, whether in the form of a fine or settlement resulting from a finding of an infringement;​[59]​ 8 cases had to be closed mostly on grounds of administrative prioritisation or due to action taken by the European Commission in the relevant case;​[60]​ in 1 case the proceedings were put on hold;​[61]​ in 2 cases the proceedings reached a statement of objections;​[62]​ in 3 cases the proceedings remained on-going (at the time of the winding down of the OFT).​[63]​
·	Abusive conduct—in 6 cases pursued by the OFT the matter was closed on various grounds, whether administrative prioritisation or insufficient evidence found by the OFT;​[64]​ in 3 cases, the last mile stone reached (at the time of the winding down of the OFT) was a public consultation on the commitments offered​[65]​ and a statement of objections;​[66]​ in 1 case the proceedings were still on-going.​[67]​
·	Criminal cartel enforcement—7 cases were triggered by OFT action: only 1 case reached successful conclusion;​[68]​ 3 cases had to be closed within a year or so with no action taken;​[69]​ in 2 cases the proceedings remained ongoing (at the time of the winding down of the OFT);​[70]​ and 1 case ended in catastrophic failure.​[71]​
Fairly and legitimately, such figures raise serious questions (and even concerns) about the enforcement agenda, the work prioritisation and the performance of the principal UK competition authority over a significant period of time in these three most important areas of enforcement. At the same time, the OFT should be given the credit due for its work and output in the other two major branches of UK competition law and policy, namely merger control and market investigation references.​[72]​ Nonetheless, this fact arguably aggravates the questions of doubt and emboldens concerns over the work conducted by the OFT in the three main areas of enforcement. Especially when it comes to market investigations, it should be noted that this area fundamentally differs from enforcement in the areas of anticompetitive behaviour (including cartel criminalisation) and abusive dominance; in the latter areas, a charge has to be levied against a business entity or an individual (in the case of cartel prosecution). Levying such a charge requires highly delicate work in terms of selecting the right cases in the first place and seeing those to a successful completion whilst conducting an effective, efficient and fair investigation. Ultimately, it is this line of work – investigating cartels and serious abusive dominance – which gives UK competition authorities (indeed any competition authority) the opportunity to deliver both highly effective enforcement and impressive results for consumers; whereas a line of work, such as market investigation references, whilst very important, has more of a complementary or supplementary role to play.
The picture painted here does not seem to have changed in any material respect since the inauguration of the CMA. One key indicator to be used here concerns the criminalisation of cartels. The CMA has pursued only one criminal cartel prosecution, which in fact had previously been opened by the OFT.​[73]​ This means that for over 5 years, the CMA has not had a single criminal enforcement matter started, notwithstanding the key amendment introduced to the EA2002 under the ERRA2013, namely removing the requirement to show an individual acted ‘dishonestly’ in committing a cartel offence under section 188 of the EA2002 and thus making it easier to prosecute individuals.​[74]​ 
6.2	SECTOR REGULATORS  
The UK competition law regime extends enforcement powers to relevant sector regulators who – concurrently with the CMA – are able to apply the chapter I and chapter II prohibitions of the CA1998.​[75]​ These regulators are also designated as national competition authorities within the European Competition Network (ECN) and thus are able to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.​[76]​
The concurrency forum – currently known as the UK Competition Network (UKCN) – saw a number of developments over the years, most recently as a result of ERRA2013. Specifically, the Act: stresses the duty on the relevant regulators to prioritise competition enforcement in their work; seeks to ensure greater transparency in the work of the UKCN; and centralises the role of the CMA within the Network. In parallel, the Act gives the power to the Secretary of State for BEIS to remove the competition enforcement functions of any of the relevant regulators.​[77]​ All of these alterations to the concurrency framework are significant and they come to strengthen competition enforcement in the sectors with greater involvement by the CMA.​[78]​
The changes brought by ERRA2013 were introduced at a time when arguably Brexit was nothing more than a fanciful dream on the part of Euro-sceptic members of the UK Conservative party. Given Brexit is no longer a fanciful prospect, the question naturally arises whether such changes still would have been introduced in a Brexit scenario. 
This is by no means an easy question. On the one hand, it can be said that there is no reason why the changes would still not have been introduced in a Brexit environment based on the fact that successive UK governments in recent times have been committed to competitive markets and effective competition enforcement. On the other hand, it can be easily contended that the changes would not have occurred because Brexit has fundamentally altered both political and economic realities. Such alteration has left no certainty that government would want to prioritise competition considerations in this manner in the sectors and to cause the role and scope of non-competition considerations found at the heart of sectoral regulation to shrink. 
It is probably unnecessary for one to become absorbed into a hypothetical debate on these opposite answers to such an important question; not least because there is in fact a third possible answer to the question, which is both pragmatic and practical. According to this third answer – notwithstanding these changes – the scope for reliance on non-competition considerations in the sectors and for the CMA to end up in the same position as the old OFT remains rather generous. Two main reasons in particular would support this view. 
First, whilst ERRA2013 has enhanced the position of the CMA – vis-à-vis competition enforcement in the sectors – it has not eliminated the possibility of government intervention. Moreover, ERRA2013 itself does arm the Secretary of State for BEIS with the power to disarm the regulators of their competition enforcement power, albeit for competition and consumer interests purposes—as stated in the Act. 
Secondly, even in relation to the enhanced position of the CMA, ERRA2013 itself also provides for high-level strategic steer to be given by government to the CMA. The steer mechanism does give government the opportunity to influence the CMA according to prevailing circumstances of the relevant time through prescribing the course of action to be taken by it (the CMA).​[79]​
The CMA’s independence is likely to be tested post-Brexit in light of the existence of the steer mechanism. Brexit and the steer mechanism open up the possibility for competition enforcement and regulation in the sectors to be aligned with government policy especially when political and economic circumstances call for it. Under such alignment, competition considerations do not have to be overlooked: they can still be referred to, but perhaps among other non-competition considerations and without using a trade-off for the different considerations or setting them in a hierarchical order.​[80]​ This can cause competition considerations to become marginalised at the general economic policy level and could place the CMA in a difficult position when looking into specific enforcement actions or formulating its own policy.   
7.	REFLECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis conducted above has a number of implications. In this part, an attempt will be made to present these implications and consider them carefully. The hope is that the future path would be marked for domestic enforcement and policy-formulation as well as further academic research on the topic of Brexit and competition law.   
7.1	THE OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK OF INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
There is clear evidence that the current thinking and policy of government are focused – quite notably – on future industrial strategy, competitiveness and future trade relations with other countries. Brexit has made this focus rather essential. Government seems determined to pursue a highly pro-active industrial strategy, made of a number of components, which were highlighted above.​[81]​
Building an industrial strategy based on various components as those appearing in the government’s Green and White Papers on industrial strategy, discussed in part 4 of the article, is not necessarily an attempt by government to achieve comprehensiveness, complementarities or completeness, let alone convergence amongst these components. Indeed, combining all of these components under the umbrella of industrial strategy opens the prospect for things like competitiveness and trade considerations to easily triumph competition and its considerations. 
As things stand, there is no strong evidence to point directly and decisively towards a deep, unchanged commitment to competition, competition law and competition policy post-Brexit except for brief statements made by government.​[82]​ This does not mean there is strong evidence to the contrary. The emphasis that competition, competition law and competition policy have received on the part of government in recent times has unfolded within the framework of trade policy and competitiveness and the overarching framework of industrial strategy. Such an approach to competition, competition law and competition policy in context should not be condemned outright. There are many situations in which trade policy and competition policy can function very well alongside each other.​[83]​ Yet, it is always worth remembering that trade policy involves concessions offered through political channels in both explicit and covert manners. Competition policy cannot tolerate such concessions, let alone anything in covert form given the harm this would cause to the essential qualities of transparency, legal certainty, consistency, fairness and predictability among others. This only emboldens the second implication of the analysis concerning the role of the CMA as the UK’s main competition watchdog.
7.2.	THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CMA
The CMA is about to enter a new era in which its leadership is going to be required at many junctures of law and policy. The times ahead are challenging, especially with the prospects of the larger role government is likely to play whether in pure competition law matters or within arenas with direct impact on the field of competition law. Only time will tell whether the CMA will stand up for competition or consumer interests in the face of the formidable hand of central government. The uncertainty in this case is heightened because this hand consistently pushes up the national agenda issues of trade policy and competitiveness using an industrial strategy, which lacks an appropriate trade-off. 
The CMA will need strong leadership to: engage in strong advocacy vis-à-vis government when competition considerations are likely to be overshadowed or undermined; ensure that its work continues to be conducted in an open manner which requires in some cases having to make its arguments and reservations about a given matter publicly; and strive towards stewardship to influence sectoral regulators in a positive way whilst maintaining appropriate level of cooperation and trust with these regulators. 
The points made here all concern the role of the CMA domestically. It should be noted that the CMA will also face challenges internationally as a result of Brexit. These international challenges are beyond the scope of the present article, though they are equally important to assess.​[84]​
7.3. 	IMPERATIVE AND VOLUNTARY CHANGES TO UK COMPETITION LAW 
The future domestic (and international) roles of the CMA post-Brexit will be impacted directly by future changes to UK competition law. Brexit mandates certain changes be made to UK competition law. There has been no shortage of commentary in the literature on all of these changes. Frankly, identifying the imperative changes UK competition law must undergo following Brexit is not a particularly difficult task. Government and the CMA are fully aware of these changes and most of them are already in place and ready to be implemented, following the adoption of the Withdrawal Act 2018 and the Competition (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. As remarked above, when discussing the Brexit competition law question, one must look not only at these changes but also beyond them. The present discussion does that: it focuses in particular on what may be termed voluntary changes, i.e. changes not mandated by Brexit but which government might end up introducing, regardless of the reasons for such changes or the motives behind them. The discussion will not consider imperative changes, most, if not all, of which, in fact, concern, and are triggered by, the current and future relationship between UK and EU competition law. It is more relevant therefore for these changes to be discussed in the context of that relationship especially when considering section 60 of the CA1998 (mentioned in part 2 above) and its intended substitute, the proposed section 60A.​[85]​
When discussing voluntary changes to UK competition law post-Brexit, it is crucial, as noted above,​[86]​ to assess the necessity and desirability of these changes. 
Currently, two sets of voluntary changes are on the table: the Tyrie proposals mentioned in part 2 above; and the Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel led by Jason Furman,​[87]​ ‘Unlocking digital competition’ which was published in March 2019. The Furman Report was requested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for BEIS whereas the Tyrie Proposals were requested by the Secretary of State for BEIS with an expression of interest in them by the Prime Minister. 
The analysis conducted below will focus on the Tyrie Proposals. Regarding the Furman Report, it concerns the international strand of the Brexit competition law question more than the domestic strand. One way to demonstrate this would be to consider the outcome in the event the various recommendations contained in the Report are implemented. In such case, the extraterritorial arm of the CMA will be extended to reach the conduct and operations of the ‘big players’ in digital markets — the digital platforms — which are all non-UK entities. For this reason, this author examines the Report and its recommendations in the context of the future place of the UK competition law regime at the international level.​[88]​ It is worth noting however that the Tyrie Proposals do have a degree of overlap, albeit a modest one, with the Furman Report: the Proposals do refer to the growth of digitalisation and cite it as one of two reasons why the status quo, whilst not seen as ‘broken’, merits change. The Furman Report comes to similar conclusions.
The Tyrie Proposals address aspects of competition law and consumer protection law; the latter are beyond the scope of the present analysis. In relation to the competition law aspects, several points made in the Proposals are noteworthy. Needless to say, the Proposals are not entirely free from controversy,​[89]​ especially in terms of the attempted distinction between the protection of competition and the protection of consumers and their interests. 
According to the Proposals, the CMA should have ‘an overriding statutory duty to treat consumer interests as paramount’.​[90]​ There is little quarrel one could have with any suggestion that the CMA should focus on or safeguard the interests of consumers. The difficulty with this statement in the Proposals is the impression it conveys that the current legislative basis is somewhat insufficient for the CMA to do so. It is doubtful that this is the case. The provisions of the CA1998, EA2002 and ERRA2013 show not only the primary concern of the CMA with the consumers but also do impose the necessary duty on the CMA to safeguard their interests. Section 25(3) of the ERRA — to which the Proposals refer and deem insufficient — lays down a duty on the CMA to act ‘for the benefit of consumers’. In making the case for the new statutory duty to protect consumers directly the proposals appear to reject the well-established position of protecting and promoting the interests of consumers through protecting competition. 
It is doubtful — even if this new duty is legislated for — this will drastically change the current situation or even improve it. What the CMA needs to do is ‘get-on’ with its work rather than seek a legislative change, which is almost wholly cosmetic; not to mention the fact that this will raise questions about the commitment to competition and its vital protection. The Proposals contain one notable statement which makes the distinction, suggested therein, between the protection of competition and the protection of consumer interests vague, namely that the ‘new statutory consumer interest duty should not constrain the CMA from intervening to promote and protect the competitive process.’​[91]​ It is worth bearing in mind that – under UK competition law – competition is seen as means to an end and is not an end in itself. Competition is protected in order to deliver important consumer benefits, especially in terms of lower prices, better quality and more choice. As things stand, the CMA is able to protect consumers along a wide spectrum of competition law and consumer protection tools. These tools can easily be deployed at present in order to ensure that the ‘economic interests of consumers’ — as the Proposals suggest — are paramount. 
The controversial nature of the Tyrie Proposals extends to other points as well. This includes the suggestion of having the CMA lose its power of criminal cartel enforcement. According to the Proposals, it might be best to shift the power to another public body because of the perceived failure of the CMA (and the old OFT) to use this power effectively and successfully. Interestingly, until the publication of the Proposals, both authorities were strong supporters of the criminal cartel offence under the EA2002 as an important tool for punishing those responsible for serious anticompetitive conduct and enhancing the level of anti-cartel deterrence in the UK. More interestingly, this suggestion has come at a time when the CMA is about to be freed from the constraints of EU competition law as a result of Brexit and enjoy full freedom and independence in competition enforcement. This in fact carries enormous potential for a new era of successful criminal cartel enforcement to begin. In a post-Brexit world, the cartel offence may in fact help the CMA as it builds its international enforcement strategy and in its future fight against international cartels. Moreover, the suggestion in the Proposals can be seen as contradicting the views of government and views within the CMA that the UK criminalisation of cartel behaviour could serve the CMA well when building international cooperation and will enable it to achieve closer bilateral links with certain world competition authorities than the links established by the European Commission with the latter.​[92]​
The controversial aspects of the Tyrie Proposals discussed above should not overshadow the several positive suggestions contained therein, including: the suggestion to increase the level of compensation for whistle-blowers; the suggestion to improve the operation of the mechanisms of market investigations and market studies under the EA2002; the suggestion to enhance the quality of CMA procedures and investigations; the suggestion to improve the judicial review of CMA decisions; the suggestion to rid the CMA of its responsibility to handle the review of certain decisions made by sector regulators; and even the suggestion to consider introducing some form of mandatory notification requirement for certain mergers. Many of these suggestions can be seen as desirable and having considerable merit. Government would do well to consider them seriously. 
The fact that the Tyrie Proposals suggest a large number of controversial and desirable changes makes it necessary to assess whether any future reform, following the delivering of Brexit, should take the form of various changes to be applied to certain provisions of the CA1998 and EA2002 or be far more radical with a new competition law regime to be based on fresh legislation. The Proposals favour the former option, though they do recognise that a ‘fundamental rewrite of the statute book’ has key advantages. The choice between the two options — especially because of Brexit — is indeed difficult. There is no particular desire on the part of this author to advocate the sweeping reform option merely because of its key advantages. Pragmatically speaking however, regardless of the two options, it is difficult to see how post-Brexit, changes will not be made to the UK competition law regime, beyond the imperative changes mandated by Brexit itself. As noted in part 2 above, the likelihood for voluntary reform is rather high. The concern is that once the UK has left the EU, a chain of changes to UK competition law will be set in motion without it being limited in terms of duration. When one considers the magnitude of all post-Brexit changes, imperative and voluntary ones, the sweeping reform option including a fundamental rewrite of the existing laws acquires an added value. 
Nevertheless, ultimately predicting what course the UK will follow once it has left the EU is virtually an impossible task especially because of the uncertainties of Brexit and the increasingly unpredictable nature of the political process in the UK. This, in turn, make it necessary to reflect on domestic politics and its influence on and within the UK competition law regime.      
7.4.	THE ROLE OF POLITICS
There can never be a denial that politics is relevant in the formulation of competition policy and the enforcement of competition rules. A development such as Brexit makes politics more relevant, especially with the rise of populism—a current trend in UK politics and elsewhere. This point is directly linked to the role industrial policy may play in the future. At a time when the debate on the need to embrace industrial policy and national champions (in the case of the EU, European champions) is heating up globally, but most notably within the EU and some of its leading member states (such as Germany and France),​[93]​ a post-Brexit UK may well become either encouraged or forced to do just that. 
Obviously, whether such scenario will materialise largely depends on the future relationship the UK and the EU will develop. In the event that close post-Brexit cooperation will be established, this will dampen the incentives of UK politicians to opt for hard-core industrial policy of the past. In the absence of such prospect, it is highly probable – especially with a majority Conservative government in place – these politicians will opt for protectionism and an alignment in position with the current US administration in Washington which has been critical of the EU supportive of Brexit.   
8.	CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Brexit makes it difficult, if not impossible, to predict future directions of domestic competition enforcement in the UK. Since the 2016 referendum, the UK competition law community has been seeking to understand the Brexit competition law question. Insights from government and the CMA on this question have been rather urgent. In fairness, only a modest attempt has been made to explain the implications of Brexit for UK competition policy. The reference to ‘policy’ in this case as opposed to ‘law’ is intentional. 
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